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Abstract
There are several challenges in the design and operation of Wireless Personal Area Networks
(WPANs) such as wireless networking and communication, power consumption, and mobility.
Hence, the operation of several WPANs within the same area can result in collision if two
WPANs operate in the same wireless channel and come in close range. Therefore, methods for
collision detection and prevention need to be validated properly due to the sensitivity of the
applications of WPANs. Existing approaches depend on paper and pencil methods to proof
the correctness of proposed methods, which might not be enough when practical issues, such as
mobility, are taken into consideration. In this paper, we use formal analysis in order to verify
the correctness of collision prevention conditions for two WPANs.
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1 Introduction and Motivation
Wireless Personal Area Networks (WPANs) are commonly used in healthcare systems due to
the increasing need for technologies that enable the continuous remote monitoring of elderly
people that provides alerting mechanisms for emergency situations. Hence, several types of
medical sensors and devices are broadly available to individuals and are being used at their
homes. This has led to the emergent of WPANs that enables communication between these
devices. This technology has been widely used in several domain, in particular, in healthcare
environments. Due to safety critical nature of their applications, the correctness of operation
for these wireless systems is of paramount importance. Therefore, a signiﬁcant portion of their
design eﬀorts is spent on analyzing the designs in order to catch as many functionality errors as
possible at early stages of the design process, which enables enhancing the performance metrics
prior to the production.
As opposed to detection methods that allow the collision to occur, collision prevention
methods may stop certain collisions from happening during the operation of WPANs if certain
conditions were met. Hence, collision prevention strategies can guarantee that collisions never
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occur. The authors in [11] presented suﬃcient and necessary condition for collision prevention
for two WPANs operating in close range. While the conditions were formalized and proofs were
given mathematically, it is essential to provide formal analysis for the WPANs and show formally
that the given conditions indeed are suﬃcient to avoid and prevent collisions. The automated
proof can help provide more assurance, in particular, verifying the system for all possible states.
Formal methods [2] use mathematical models for the analysis of computing, communication,
and industrial systems in order to establish system correctness with mathematical rigor.
Formal methods have been used in modeling and veriﬁcation of diﬀerent types of medical
systems [9]. The work in [7] presented an embedding and veriﬁcation of ZigBee protocol in
Event-B. A qualitative analysis of Collision Resolution Protocol for wireless networks was also
proposed in [12]. The work in [10] used Higher Order Logic (HOL) theorem proving for anal-
ysis of the probabilistic properties in wireless systems. The work in [3, 4] formalized WBSN
controller for reading ECG signal utilizing formal speciﬁcation requirement of such medical
systems [8]. Most formal analysis methods proposed for wireless systems addressed the issue of
collision detection, and to the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst eﬀort to provide formal
analysis for collision prevention and avoidance mechanism in WPANs. This paper uses NuSMV
model checker [6] in order to formalize WPANs, and then formally proof all collision prevention
conditions provided in [11]. This will increase the trust in the safety critical system under con-
sideration, provide automatic proof with full coverage, and provide the necessary background
to generalize the proofs for more complex scenarios such as multiple WPANs.
2 Speciﬁcations of Collision Analysis in WPANs
In this section we present the speciﬁcation of collision analysis and avoidance mechanism based
on [11]. The WPAN system speciﬁcations are presented based on the beacon-enable mode of
IEEE 802.15.4 MAC protocol [1] for the operations of WPANs. The Superframe duration (SD)
represents the active portion of the superframe (beacon interval or BI), during which packets
can be transmitted. The coordinator controls the beacon interval and superframe duration
through two parameters, namely beacon order (BO) and superframe order (SO) as follows:
BI = aBaseSuperframeDuration × 2BO, and SD = aBaseSuperframeDuration × 2SO, where
0 ≤ SO ≤ BO ≤ 14. The coordinator handles the values of BO and SO as well as the allocation
between contention access period (CAP) and the contention free period (CFP).
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Figure 1: Collision model for two WPANs[11]
A collision occurs when two coordinators
are within the radio range of each other and
part of their superframe active periods over-
laps. Any overlap between active period and
beacon is not considered as a collision be-
cause beacon transmissions have absolute pri-
ority over data packet transmissions. Active
and inactive period durations are diﬀerent
for diﬀerent WPANs according to the ﬁgure.
In addition, superframe start time varies be-
tween diﬀerent WPANs. Two WPANs,Wa
and Wb, can be supported if the active pe-
riods SDa and SDb do not collide at any
time in the future. Figure 1 shows WPANs
collision model with the following notation:
a = BIa, a1 = SDa, b = BIb, b1 = SDb.
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Assume that the start of WPAN Wb is delayed by p units, then a collision will happen if
there are two points α from Wa and β from Wb will occur at the same time in the future. This
will happen if there exist n and m such that na+ α = mb+ β + p. This means that during the
nth beacon of Wa and mth beacon of Wa, points α and β will collide. In the following, only
cases where p ≥ a1 are considered, since Wb comes after Wa, therefore, if p is less than a1, there
will be a collision.
Theorem 2.1. [11]
Let a, b ∈ N, such that a > 1, and b > 1. Let a1, b1, p ∈ N, such that 0 < a1 ≤ p < a, and
0 < b1 < b. Let α, β such that 0 < α ≤ a1 and 0 < β ≤ b1,
∃n,m ∈ Z na+ α = mb+ β + p ⇐⇒ ∃k ∈ Z p+ β − α = k ∗ gcd(a, b)
Theorem 2.1 states that if the value of p+ β − α is a multiple of the greatest common
divisor of a and b: gcd(a, b), then the two WPANs, Wa and Wb, will collide at some point in
the future. Therefore, the value of p should be chosen to be diﬀerent from k ∗ gcd(a, b) + α− β,
otherwise there will be a collision between the WPANs. Since 0 < α ≤ a1 and 0 < β ≤ b1, the
range of gcd(a, b) + α− β is gcd(a, b)− b1 ≤ gcd(a, b) + α− β ≤ gcd(a, b) + a1. Hence p should
be chosen outside this range. Figure 2 shows the ranges from which p should be chosen.
According to Figure 2, there are no possible choices for p if a1 + b1 > gcd(a, b). Corollary
2.2 states this fact formally, where Support(Wa,Wb) is the predicate: “Wa and Wb can be
supported simultaneously”
Corollary 2.2. [11] Let a, b ∈ N, such that a > 1 and b > 1, then Support(Wa,Wb) ⇐⇒
∃p, a1 ≤ p < a, ∀α, β, 0 < α ≤ a1, 0 < β ≤ b1,¬∃k ∈ N, p+ β − α = k ∗ gcd(a, b)
Theorem 2.3. [11]
Let a, b ∈ N, such that a > 1 and b > 1, Support(Wa,Wb) ⇐⇒ a1 + b1 ≤ gcd(a, b)
Theorem 2.3 gives a straightforward collision prevention condition to check if two WPANs
can coexist without collisions:
a1 + b1 ≤ gcd(a, b) (1)
Theorem 2.3 states that if the condition (1) is satisﬁed, then the two WPANs can be
scheduled in such a way that they will never collide, on the other hand, if this condition is
not satisﬁed, the two WPANs will collide in the future regardless of any collision avoidance
mechanism used. In order to further simplify the collision prevention conditions in (1), taking
into account the fact that the beacon interval and the superframe duration are power of 2,
let A, A1, B, and B1 such that a = 2
A, a1 = 2
A1 , b = 2B , and b1 = 2
B1 . Note that
gcd(2A, 2B) = 2min(A,B). For any given three positive integers A1, B1, and C, the condition
2A1 + 2B1 ≤ 2C is satisﬁed iﬀ 0 ≤ A1 ≤ C − 1 and 0 ≤ B1 ≤ C − 1.
The collision prevention condition (1) becomes A1 < min(A,B) and B1 < min(A,B),
which states the necessary condition for collision prevention, where the order of the superframe
of each WPAN has to be strictly smaller than the order of the beacon intervals of both WPANs.
This means that the order of the superframe of each WPAN has to be strictly smaller than
the order of its beacon interval, i.e., the superframe duration cannot exceed half of the beacon
interval. In the next section, we provide formal analysis of WPANs, where we use NuSMV
model checking in order to validate the above conditions for collision prevention.
3 Formal Analysis of Collision Prevention for TwoWPANs
Model checking [5] (or property checking) is a formal veriﬁcation technique that veriﬁes whether
a model of a system meets a given speciﬁcation. The method provides exhaustive coverage
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Figure 2: The possible choices of p, given a, b, a1, and b1 [11]
for the system and is conducted automatically. NuSMV model checker provides cutting-edge
formal veriﬁcation methods based on optimized techniques. Therefore, we will use NuSMV
in order to model and verify the WPAN model. The speciﬁcation of the protocol states that
the frame interval is equal to SFD∗2BO, and superframe duration is equal to SFD∗2SI , where
1 ≤ SI ≤ BO ≤ 14. We used a variable that allows the veriﬁcation of the system for several
variables of the superframe duration. The ﬁnal and most signiﬁcant step is to deﬁne and verify
the set of theorems given for the correct operation of the WPAN protocol described above.
Property 1. is used to formalize theorem 2.1, which states that the two WPANs Wa and Wb
will collide at some point in the future if the value of p+ β − α is a multiple of the greatest
common divisor of a and b: gcd(a, b). This property is formalized as given below for the SMV
model.
SPEC AG (EF((n * a + alpha = m * b + beta + p) -> (p + beta - alpha = k * gcd))
& EF((p + beta - alpha = k * gcd) -> (n * a + alpha = m * b + beta + p)))
This property states that for all paths and for all states, anywhere in the path, if the value
n ∗ a+ α is equal to the value m ∗ b+ β + p, then, there is a path in the future with k, where
p+β−α must be equal to k ∗ gcd. Equivalence between two propositions is deﬁned using both
ways implication. Hence, the second part states the other side of the implication, which, as a
result demonstrates equivalence between the two propositions. This property is then veriﬁed
for the system using NuSMV tool.
Property 2. is used to specify the situation where two WPANs are supported simultane-
ously as illustrated in Figure 2. The property states that there are no possible choices for p
if a1 + b1 > gcd(a, b). Corollary 2.2 states this fact formally, where Support(Wa,Wb) is the
predicate: “Wa and Wb can be supported simultaneously”. Property 2 below is used to specify
the required condition for the support predicate deﬁned above as illustrated in Corollary 2.2,
which states that if p is chosen according to the condition given, then, there is a choice of k,
where the collision can be avoided. This property is modeled and veriﬁed using NuSMV.
SPEC AG ( (p > a1 & p < a ) -> AG (!(p + beta - alpha = k * gcd)))
Property 3. is used to model theorem 2.3 which gives a straightforward collision prevention
condition to check if two WPANs can coexist without collisions: a1 + b1 ≤ gcd(a, b), This
condition allows two WPANs to be scheduled in such a way that they will never collide. The
theorem is formalized as show below, where the predicate Support(Wa,Wb) is formalized using
the deﬁnition given in Corollary 2.2, and two ways implication is used to represent equivalence.
The property is veriﬁed in NuSMV successfully.
SPEC AG (((a1 + b1) <= gcd) -> (p > a1 & p < a ) -> AG((!(p + beta - alpha = k * gcd)))
&(p > a1 & p < a ) -> AG((!(p + beta - alpha = k * gcd))) -> ((a1 + b1) <= gcd))
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Property 4. is used to formalize the simpliﬁed collision prevention condition deﬁned based
on equation 1, where a1 < min(a, b) is deﬁned using a1 < a and a1 < b, which is equivalent.
Corollary 2.2 is used to deﬁne Support(Wa,Wb).
SPEC AG (((a1 < a) & (a1 < b) & (b1 < a) & (b1 < b) ) ->
(p > a1 & p < a ) -> AG((!(p + beta - alpha = k * gcd))) & (p > a1 & p < a ) ->
AG((!(p + beta - alpha = k * gcd))) -> ((a1 < a) & (a1 < b) & (b1 < a) & (b1 < b)))
4 Conclusion
In the operation of personal area networks, in particular for health applications, it is important
to provide the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for collisions not to happen in neighboring
IEEE 802.15.4 WPANs. If certain conditions are not satisﬁed, collisions will occur periodically,
and hence, collision and recovery mechanisms will only provide temporary solution. Therefore,
it is important to validate collision prevention mechanisms thoughtfully. In this work, we
used model checking formal analysis method in order to model and validate these mechanisms
in WPANs, where Several properties were modeled and veriﬁed for collision prevention. It
is intended to generalize these results for an arbitrary number of WPANs, and propose a
distributed protocol for the selection of Beacon Intervals that ensure prevention of collisions.
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